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modern man. 
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Søren Aabye Kierkegaard and Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky are two 
figures who never met, who were shaped by different experiences and who 
came from completely dissimilar environments, but who share similar ideas, 
intuitions and understandings of their worlds. The former, a self-published 
preacher of integrity, unrecognized and misunderstood by his contemporaries, 
ended his life in bitterness and financial bankruptcy. The latter, a well-
published gambler, author of great renown, appreciated and listened to, lived a 
fairly good life through his writing. Kierkegaard, a traveler of the imagination, 
enclosed by the dense streets of Copenhagen, and Dostoyevsky, a frequent 
passenger of international trains and coaches running across Russia, Prussia, 
the Lands of Partitioned Poland, and Switzerland, were both thinkers who eye-
witnessed, understood and articulated the social change that came as a result 
of the revolutions of the nineteenth century and the production of the modern 
man, which in turn reflected the crisis of culture, political orders and the 
Christian religion. The main discourses of the age where shaped by the clash 
between the apologists of the great systems of Kant and Hegel, and the Ro-
mantics. The intellectual dispute between the former group – defenders of 
conservative values – and the latter – advocates of absolutely free individual – 
produced on the one hand disinterested and self-complacent bourgeoisie, and 
on the other absolute relativists and nihilists. Theology and philosophy, but al-
                                                 
* I would like to acknowledge my deep appreciation for Jessica Louise Trevitt’s (a PhD 
student at Monash University, Melbourne) linguistic corrections.  
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so literature and art reflected the change in religious discourses and expressed 
the new challenges that were awaiting not only the status of religious institu-
tions but also the faith of particular individuals. Growing textual criticism and 
historical studies started undermining the credibility of Scriptures as a reliable 
foundation for culture.  
Through an analysis of Kierkegaard’s and Dostoevsky’s approaches to the 
theme of the death of Christ – one of the major leitmotifs in the debate of their 
contemporaries conveyed through theological and philosophical considera-
tions, but also expressed in novels and in art – I show how the thinkers com-
prehended and articulated in their works the religious challenges awaiting the 
modern man. In this exposition I concentrate on particular works of the think-
ers that account for their exemplary engagements with the theme of the dead 
Christ. An image of the crucified Christ from Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the 
Truth?1 and Practice in Christianity,2 and Dostoevsky’s use of Holbein’s 
Dead Christ in his novel The Idiot3 will here serve as  what I call the image of 
the dead Christ.  
First, I show that Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky apply in their writings the 
image of the dead Christ as a structural device and a method used to redefine 
Christianity in the wake of modernity. For Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky an in-
dividual identifies their religious status in relation to what stands for the ex-
treme and paradoxical of the Christian faith: the image of the dead Christ. In 
the former thinker’s thought this finds its expression in an admirer-follower 
distinction. The latter author introduces a methodology of redefining the indi-
vidual’s relation to Christianity by presenting Muishkin’s, Rogojin’s, and 
Hippolyte’s relationship to the image of the dead Christ.  
Second, I present the thinkers’ engagement with the image of the dead 
Christ as a response to modern aesthetics. Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky chal-
lenge the imagery and aesthetic confines of the picture by pointing beyond the 
immediate experience of the reader-viewer. Although the aesthetic experience 
cannot substitute the religious experience, both authors appeal to an aesthetic 
means of ekphrasis to allow the religious idea to interact with the viewer-
reader. 
Lastly, analyzing Kierkegaard’s and Dostoevsky’s employment of the im-
age of the dead Christ in their writings, I point to how the authors define the 
human condition of their contemporaries. I show that the thinkers attempt 
through their works to challenge the way people think about Christianity. In 
order to properly diagnose the condition of the age, the thinkers introduce 
                                                 
1. Søren Kierkegaard, “Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to 
Death for the Truth?,” Without Authority, H. and E. Hong ed., trans. (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton Univ. Press, 1997), p. 49-90. 
2. Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, H. and E. Hong, ed., trans. (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1991). 
3. Fyodor M. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, Eva M. Martin, trans. (London: Heron Books, 
1968).  
Downloaded from Brill.com07/04/2019 04:06:28PM
via KU Leuven Libraries
112                                                             The Dostoevsky Journal: An Independent Review 
  112
measures of paradoxical models of the Christian ideal, that is a guerilla-martyr 
for Kierkegaard and an idiot for Dostoevsky.  
 
I. Redifining Christianity 
Kierkegaard’s writings of 1848 onwards are marked by his constant refer-
ences to the death of Christ. The thinker links this subject to his task of “rede-
fining Christianity” in the wake of modernity. His pseudonymous Practice in 
Christianity deals with presenting a genuine definition of a Christian. The 
work finds a resolution to the problem in a fundamental distinction between 
an admirer of Christ and a follower of Christ. The admirer approaches Christ 
in a disinterested way.4 The admirer merely admires Christ for his work of 
atonement and redemption. The admirer in thankfulness and appreciation ob-
jectively appropriates the narrative of sin, incarnation and redemption. In self-
complacence the admirer chooses the right religion, hoping it will fix the 
whole mess called “evil” and bring him a cozy spot in a vaguely-
comprehended heaven.  
The genuine Christian however is someone with a different approach to 
Christ than the admirer.5 A Christian is someone who in his religious approach 
breaks through the mere admiration of Christ and, disregarding the centuries 
of established Christianity, becomes what Kierkegaard calls “contemporary 
with Christ.” As contemporary with Christ, a Christian starts to follow their 
master just like the disciples did centuries ago. To become a Christ-follower 
one has to face the ‘offence’ that comprises the paradox of God-man and the 
horror of the death of Christ.  
Practice in Christianity published in 1850 by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym 
Anti-Climacus has been accompanied by another of his pseudonymous works 
written by H.H., Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to 
Death for the Truth? This was published a year earlier, but was written almost 
simultaneously with the former. The former work, written in the style of the 
meditational lectio divina of devotio moderna, has been purposefully founded 
in the latter, a more aggressive and violent work.6 The notion of martyrdom as 
the inevitable destiny of a true Christian as expressed in Practice in Christian-
ity has been already phrased in the eponymous question of the work Does a 
Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth? – 
the essay that was to serve as a guerilla to the later published work of Anti-
                                                 
4. Brian Gregor, “Thinking Through Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacus: Art, Imagination, 
And Imitation,” Hey J L, 50, no. 3 (2009): 448, 453. 
5. George Pattison, Kierkegaard's Upbuilding Discourses: Philosophy, Literature, and 
Theology (London and New York: Routledge 2013), p. 158. 
6. For more on Kierkegaard’s relations to such devotional literature see: Christopher B. 
Barnett, “ ‘Should One Suffer Death for the Truth?’: Kierkegaard, Erbauungsliteratur, and 
the Imitation of Christ,” Journal for the History of Modern Theology, 15 (2008): 232-47; 
Christopher B. Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011); Joel 
D. S. Rasmussen, Between Irony and Witness: Kierkegaard's Poetics of Faith, Hope, and 
Love (New York and London: T&T Clark, 2005). 
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Climacus.7 Reading these works in the intended order, the reader stumbles on 
the somehow intense and extreme, and almost, on the first impression, awk-
wardly positioned image of horror: “the picture of the Crucified One.” This 
dreadful picture bothers, torments, and haunts the main characters of the 
above-mentioned pseudonymous works, and, as will be shown later in this es-
say, is to torment the reader as well.  
Less than a quarter of a century later and almost twelve years after Kierke-
gaard’s collapse on one of the streets of Copenhagen that shortly preceded his 
death, Fyodor Dostoevsky finds himself disturbed and moved by Hans Hol-
bein’s painting Dead Christ (Der Leichnam Christi im Grabe, 1521).8 The 
painting, which presents the mutilated body of Christ taken down from the 
cross, executes such a powerful impression on the Russian thinker that, bewil-
dered by it, he utters: “One could lose his faith from a painting like that.”9 The 
consequences of Dostoevsky’s encounter with the picture of horror are even 
greater. Shortly after seeing it in Kunstmuseum Basel, Dostoevsky incorpo-
rates its copy into his novel The Idiot, of which the action takes place mainly 
in St. Petersburg. Some scholars believe that the novel as a whole is orches-
trated around the theme of Holbein’s picture and that the picture itself works 
as a key to The Idiot.10 While this thesis seems somewhat radical, the work of 
Holbein is in fact one of the main themes of Dostoyevsky’s novel. The 
thought expressed by the Russian thinker upon seeing Dead Christ, which is 
then repeated by the main character of the book Prince Muishkin, indirectly 
articulates Kierkegaard’s thought that the image of the dead Christ distin-
guishes someone who does have faith from someone who does not. 
Both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky introduce the image of the dead Christ 
as a reference point in their vision of redefining Christianity in the wake of 
modernity. The modern man must face the paradox of the Christian faith in all 
its brutality and without any softening disguise that would make it easier to 
accept its requirements. In Kierkegaard’s works we can see this articulated in 
a story of a man who was brought up contemplating Christ as he is portrayed 
in sacrificial manners. In the Introduction to H.H.’s essay we read: 
“Once upon a time there was a man. As a child he had been strictly brought 
up in the Christian religion. He had not heard much of what children ordinari-
ly hear about the little baby Jesus, about angels and the like. On the other 
hand, the Crucified One had been all the more frequently depicted to him; 
therefore his picture was the one and only impression he had of the Savior. 
Although a child, he was already like an old man. This picture followed him 
                                                 
7. Andrew Burgess, “Kierkegaard, Moravian Missions, and Martyrdom,” in Robert L. 
Perkins, ed., Without Authority, The International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 18 (Ma-
con: Mercer Univ. Press, 1985), p. 184. 
8. Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 2009), pp. 549-50;  
9. K. A. Lantz, The Dostoevsky Encyclopedia (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 
2004), p. 189.  
10. Sarah J. Young, “Holbein’s Christ in the Tomb in the Structure of The Idiot,” Rus-
sian Studies in Literature, 44, no. 1 (2007): 90-102. 
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throughout his life; he never became young again, and he never lost sight of 
this picture.”11 
“In this way he secretly attended to this picture; he never spoke of it to an-
yone. But the picture steadily came closer and closer to him, and he felt its 
claim on him even more deeply.”12 
The man from the essay tested his faith toward the vision of Christ sacri-
ficed, and the picture of “the Crucified One” was for him the only (true) vision 
of Christ. For Kierkegaard, the image of the dead Christ represents the core of 
Christianity and in this he opposes his contemporary apologists of the Chris-
tian faith.13 Modern textual criticism restricted the Gospels to a narrative de-
prived of supernatural elements. Theologians and philosophers of Kierke-
gaard’s age tried to concentrate on what the Dane calls the triumphant church 
– a phenomenon that perceived the Christian religion as a part of process of 
development of history across the ages.14 The truth of Christianity was “scien-
tifically” guaranteed by fitting in with the Hegelian historicity and his theory 
of development and succession of ideas. Kierkegaard criticized that concept, 
showing that Christianity does not need any defense. According to him, only 
those who secretly do not believe in the truths of Christian religion undertake 
various types of apologetics. The truth of Christianity is its weakness, its vul-
nerability, and its paradox. To be a genuine Christian one as a single individu-
al has to face the Christ despised and violated in all its horror. Christianity and 
its truth is therefore a matter of either ‘the offense’ or faith.  
Dostoevsky seems to be giving a similar appraisal. The three main charac-
ters of The Idiot – Muishkin, Rogojin, and Hippolyte – define themselves in 
their relation to the image of the dead Christ. Over the door of one of the 
rooms in Rogojin’s house hangs a copy of Holbein’s picture, the original of 
which Muishkin saw in Switzerland. The picture ignites a brief religious dia-
logue between Muishkin and Rogojin and works as a digression in their argu-
ment about the femme fatale of St. Petersburg, Nastasia Philipovna. Rogojin 
asks Muishkin whether he is a Christian. Muishkin’s response echoes Dosto-
yevsky’s famous reaction uttered upon seeking the picture in Basel: “One 
could lose his faith from a painting like that.”15 Muishkin’s reply is indirect 
and dialectic. On the hand, he is resolved and silent about his position of being 
a Christian. On the other hand, he fails to communicate his faith in conversa-
                                                 
11. Kierkegaard, Without Authority, p. 55. 
12. Ibid., p. 55-56.  
13. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, H. and E. Hong, ed., 
transl. (Bloomington and London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1967), 4: 3862; Søren Kierkegaard, 
The Sickness Unto Death, H. and E. Hong, ed., trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 
1980), p. 87. “. . . he who first invented the notion of defending Christianity in Christendom 
is de facto Judas No. 2. . . .” 
14. Anders Holm, “The Church,” The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, John Lippitt 
and George Pattison, ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), p. 122; Erik Hanson, "Thom-
as Merton: Kierkegaard, Merton and Authenticity," Kierkegaard's Influence on Theology, 
Jon Stewart ed. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 120-22. 
15. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 207. “That picture! That picture!” “Why, a man’s faith 
might be ruined by looking at that picture!” 
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tion with Rogojin at that moment, just as he failed to articulate it in a conver-
sation with Rogojin when they met as strangers in a train. This failure of 
Muishkin reappears throughout the book. His deep infatuation with Christ’s 
death resembles the man from Kierkegaard’s works as discussed above. 
Muishkin, in a similar manner to that man from H.H.’s essay, is resolved and 
silent. However, as we progress through the book, we see that the Prince’s po-
sition may be entirely related to his mental imbalance and lack of sanity. 
Muishkin does not reveal in a direct way that he is a Christian. “Echoing” the 
Christian from Practice in Christianity, he communicates his Christianity in-
directly, by reduplicating in his life what he held as true.16 Further on in the 
text, Colia and Hippolyte indirectly confirm Muishkin’s Christianity. 
Rogojin relates to the image of the dead Christ differently. On the one hand 
he is full of passion. Dostoevsky testifies to a strange mood that Rogojin falls 
into shortly after seeing the picture. Muishkin also brings our attention to it 
when he notices involuntarily Rogojin’s “strange way of speaking and look-
ing.”17 On the other hand, Rogojin disregards the power of the image of the 
dead Christ, summarizing his relation to it with a mere “I like looking at that 
picture.”18 It seems that Rogojin situates himself as among the “many people 
[who] are unbelievers nowadays, especially Russians, [as] I have been told. 
You ought to know – you’ve lived abroad.”19 Rogojin expresses in his posi-
tion towards the picture a certain ambivalence of disinterestedness mixed with 
fury.  
An interesting interpretation contributed by one scholar of Rogojin’s con-
templation of Holbein’s painting observes that “Rogozhin likes to look at 
Holbein’s painting because it confirms his fear that Christ is not divine, but 
mortal, and seems to deny the doctrine of His Resurrection and the consequent 
redemption of mankind.”20 This could explain some of Rogojin’s behaviors 
like his attempt to “acquire” Nastasia by borrowing 100,000 rubles, his ex-
change of his gold cross for a tin cross, his failed murder of Muishkin and his 
successful murder of Nastasia. This line of thinking fits with the famous dic-
tum that has been molded from the words of Mitya Karamazov: “Without 
God…Everything is permissible.”21 
Hippolyte Terentieff’s My Necessary Explanation is a classic example of 
an early nihilist’s perception of the essence of Christianity contained in the 




16. Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, pp. 133-34. 
17. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 207. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Jeffrey Meyers, Painting and the Novel (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 
1975), p. 140. 
21. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhon-
sky, transl. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1990), p. 589. 
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There was nothing artistic about it, but the picture made me feel un-
comfortable. It represented Christ just taken down from the cross. It 
seems to me that painters as a rule represent the Saviour, both on the 
cross and taken down from it, with great beauty still upon His face. This 
marvelous beauty they strive to preserve even in His moments of deep-
est agony and passion. But there was no such beauty in Rogojin’s pic-
ture. This was the presentment of a poor mangled body which had evi-
dently suffered unbearable anguish even before its crucifixion, full of 
wounds and bruises, marks of the violence of soldiers and people, and 
of the bitterness of the moment He had fallen with the cross – all this 
combined with the anguish of the actual crucifixion.22 
 
Following that thought, Hippolyte asks himself the crucial question of how 
those who saw this distressing corpse – the apostles, and the women who eye-
witnessed this cruel tragedy – could believe that such a mutilated body would 
be resurrected. Hippolyte does not find in himself faith enough to believe. On 
the one hand, Hippolyte, following Kierkegaard’s terminology, is an admirer, 
but not a believer. On the other hand, his admiration for Christ is ethical-
religious. He admires Christ, but believes that Christ’s death – and his own 
death as he himself is on the verge of passing away – is the very end of his ex-
istence. For Hippolyte the image of the dead Christ expresses “[t]his blind, 
dumb, implacable, eternal, unreasoning force . . . and the absolute subordina-
tion of all men and things to it.”23 Hippolyte, in a similar manner to Christ, 
awaits in “fear and uncertainty”24 the terror of nothingness to come. This Dos-
toevskian honesty of uncertainty from Hippolyte seems to complete the image 
of Muishkin as a Christian model – a theme that I undertake in the last part of 
my essay. 
 
II. The limits of aesthetics 
So far I have discussed some theological and religious aspects of Kierke-
gaard’s and Dostoevsky’s engagements with the image of the dead Christ. We 
showed that the thinkers used the image of the dead Christ as a device to rede-
fine Christianity in the context of modernity. However, the works of Kierke-
gaard and Dostoevsky, apart from discussing various theological or religious 
matters, have had a deep influence on other fields. In this part of my essay, I 
                                                 
22. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 391. 
23. Ibid., p. 392. 
24. Krzysztof Michalski, The Flame of Eternity. An Interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2012), pp. 80-81. “But what is supposed to 
mean that Christ dies in fear and uncertainty? How is it possible that God is terrified? What 
could ‘God’s Anxiety’ possibly mean?. . . What is Christ afraid of?. . . Let’s take a moment 
to consider this fear, the fear of nothingness. . . .When I say that, fearing death, I am afraid 
of nothingness, I mean the end, disintegration, the annihilation of everything I know and 
can imagine, of all the flies, feelings, equations, concepts, obligations, and everything else 
that one can call ‘something.’ The prospect of death places this ‘nothing’ – the edge of all 
possible knowledge and, by the same token, of the person in me, the person I know, the 
person who sees, feels, runs, and knows – before our very eyes. It is the end of my world.” 
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show that Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky through the image of the dead Christ 
engage in the discussion regarding the status of modern aesthetics.  
Kierkegaard’s main concern in the matter is exhibited by his identifying the 
ambitions of aesthetics in taking the place of religion. The Danish thinker per-
ceives aesthetic experience attempting to substitute itself for religious experi-
ence.25 For Kierkegaard, art can only give the reader-viewer-listener the im-
mediate sense of their experience and the reflection that springs out of the 
immediate experience is always something different to the experience itself. 
Any reflection on the immediate experience is through mediation: the aesthet-
ic is therefore limited. It cannot communicate the religious for fear it will po-
eticize it. But to poeticize the religious is to alienate subjectivity from real life.  
“The religious person seeks to live in life what the poet expresses in art.”26 
The religious has to be lived out, it has to be experienced; reflection does not 
precede the truly religious and therefore it does not mediate the religious ex-
perience.  
The other dimension of Kierkegaard’s ideas on the limits of aesthetics is 
that in aesthetic experience the one who experiences does not go beyond his 
own creative self. Following the Romantic understating of aesthetics, the ex-
perience of the reader-observer-listener is not completely determined by the 
idea or by the way the idea is incorporated or encapsulated in the art piece, but 
rather by the capacity of their creative ‘I’.27 In consequence, the reader-
observer-listener in the very act of experiencing accesses merely his own im-
mediate and disinterested reaction to the appropriated object; the experience is 
thus of the immanent. The aesthetic experience therefore is unable to reach the 
transcendent. 
What is then the aesthetic status of the image of the dead Christ if we con-
sider that it is still a kind of image? The Romantic ideal of an art piece was to 
capture in itself the ideal relation between the world of the Idea/Thought and 
the material world (and then express it) in the ideal form.28 Such an art piece 
reveals in itself the optimal relation between form and content and therefore 
allows the reader-observer-listener to “participate” in the eternal/timeless of 
the Idea. For Kierkegaard the picture of “the Crucified One” from Does a 
Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth? is 
a picture that has different qualities to a piece of art that aims at expressing the 
Idea. In short, the image of the dead Christ exceeds its merely aesthetic di-
mension and works as a sign that points beyond itself. Its aesthetic dimension 
demonstrates by negating and obliterating the aesthetic qualities that which an 
                                                 
25. In this article, and here in particular, my understanding of aesthetics (and the aes-
thetic) in Kierkegaard and his rendering of aesthetic experience try to follow the appraisal 
presented in George Pattison, “Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and ‘the Aesthetic,’ ” British Jour-
nal of Aesthetics, 31, no. 2 (1991): 140-51. 
26. George Pattison, “Kierkegaard as Novelist,” Journal of Literature and Theology, 1, 
no. 2 (1987): 219.  
27. Frederick Burwick, Mimesis and its Romantic Reflections (University Park: Penn-
sylvania State Univ. Press, 2001), pp. 77-106.   
28. Pattison, “Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and ‘the Aesthetic,’ ” p. 141. 
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aesthetic object would strive for in its ideal. The picture of “the Crucified 
One” is a dynamic image. It follows its observer, acquires power over him, 
requires something of him, comes closer and closer to him; the man never los-
es sight of the picture, cannot look away, and he is driven by an inexplicable 
power to want to resemble the picture.29 The picture of “the Crucified One” 
interacts with its observer. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author H.H. circum-
scribed the aesthetic qualities of the picture: “He [the man] had always con-
sidered it ungodly that one would undertake to paint this picture and equally 
ungodly to look artistically at such a painted picture to see if it resembled him 
(the Crucified One) – instead of becoming oneself the picture that resembled 
him. . . .”30 
A similar critique of aesthetics can be found in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot. 
Beauty is one of the main subjects of the work. Although “[i]n The Idiot, 
many kinds of beauty are mentioned: female, artistic, ethical and religious,”31 
it seems that Dostoyevsky overall presents a negative assessment of beauty in 
the book. The most appealing of Dostoevsky’s expressions of the disenchant-
ment with beauty can be found in the already quoted Hippolyte’s My Neces-
sary Explanation, where the young nihilist comments on the copy of Hol-
bein’s picture in Rogojin’s house. Hippolyte notices, “It seems to me that 
painters as a rule represent the Saviour…with great beauty still upon His 
face.”32 This however is pointless, as the image of the dead Christ is a presen-
tation of a mutilated body and a representation of an unanimated corpse has no 
beauty in itself. Yet it is not the lack of beauty or the manifestation of ugliness 
that makes the sensitive and honest Hippolyte reject Christianity: the ugliness 
of the image allows the observer to be offended, disturbed, irritated, and final-
ly awakened from the self-complacent satisfaction of the bourgeois religion of 
good taste and manners. Therefore, it is the offence embedded in the image of 
the dead Christ that claims that such an ugly corpse came back to life. 
Drawing on the above-presented ideal of Romantic art – which aims at rep-
resenting the Idea in a tangible form, for example the beauty of the world – 
one sees that in Hippolyte’s eyes Holbein’s picture gives an account of the 
world as a dark and hostile place that “crushed and swallowed up a great and 
invaluable Being.”33 The young nihilist asks: “Can there be an appearance of 
that which has no form?”34 And he answers, “And yet it seemed to me, at cer-
tain moments, that I beheld in some strange and impossible form, that dark, 
dumb, irresistibly powerful, eternal force.”35 The insight gained by looking at 
the image of the dead Christ encapsulates the nature that is a “dumb mon-
                                                 
29. Kierkegaard, Without Authority, pp. 55-57. 
30. Ibid., p. 55. 
31. Wil van den Bercken, Christian Fiction and Religious Realism in the Novels of Dos-
toevsky (London: Anthem Press, 2011), p. 107. 
32. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 391. 
33. Ibid., p. 392.  
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
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ster.”36 Contrary to the Romantics, Dostoevsky through Hippolyte insists that 
art does not allow the reader-viewer-listener access to the timeless/eternal of 
the Idea that reveals itself in and through the world; Holbein’s picture demon-
strates that, in brief, Nature does not care about anything, including the Idea, 
unless the Idea is an “embodiment” of “terror and dread.”37  
The authors’ criticisms of the modern aesthetics, however, do not prohibit 
them from appealing to aesthetic devices. Although for Kierkegaard aesthetic 
experience cannot be substituted for religious experience, and the aesthetic of 
beauty eventually brings disillusion for Dostoevsky, both thinkers implement 
an aesthetic means of ekphrasis in their work. Ekphrasis is an aesthetic device 
that was initially related to how objects exist and are presented.38 The classic 
example of ekphrasis is Homer’s description of the Shield of Achilles in Book 
18 of the Iliad, which is a literary account of a work of visual art.39 Scholars 
tend to trace the philosophical dimensions of ekphrasis to its occurrence in 
Plato’s Republic. In that work Socrates claims that a painter represents not 
what already exists in nature but its imitative representation; therefore the 
painter is “at the third removed from the essential nature of the thing...third in 
the succession from the throne of truth.”40 Ekphrasis is understood here as ar-
tistic representation (in painting or sculpture) of objects that are already repre-
sentations of some reality; art understood as the fine art imitates the art of 
craftsmen whose work comprise of an imitation of the true reality. Plato criti-
cizes that kind of imitation, and his critique is consistent with his understand-
ing of the role of art in society, including textual (or rhetorical) representations 
of objects of art. How is ekphrasis understood in relation to Kierkegaard’s en-
gagement with an image? Across the history of literature, art, and philosophy 
the classic rendering of ekphrasis as a mainly rhetorical device evolves and 
expands. Among the modern considerations of ekphrasis, the dominant dis-
cussion focuses on the issue of verbal representation of what has already been 
represented visually and vice versa. The issue of whether a verbal illustration 
can represent – that is, make present – its object in the same way as can a vis-
ual representation provokes questions related to another dimension of ekphra-
sis, that of representation in any medium which is non-representable or which 
enhances the original idea in a multitude of ekphrastic actions. In fact these 
kinds of questions were strongly present among the authors Kierkegaard either 
read or heard about.  
One of the first endeavors to systematically face those issues can be found 
in Lessing’s rendering of ekphrasis in his Laocoon – a work broadly discussed 
among the Romantics and known to Kierkegaard, who referred to it in his Ei-
                                                 
36. Ibid.  
37. Ibid. 
38. On ekphrasis see: Simon Goldhill, “What is Ekphrasis for?,” in Classical Philology, 
102 (2007): 1-19.  
39. James A. H. Heffernan, Museum of Words: The Poetics of Ekphrasis from Homer to 
Ashbery (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 9-22. 
40. Plato, Republic, p. 597e.  
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ther/Or.41As the subtitle of the work suggests – An essay upon the limits of 
painting and poetry – Lessing discusses the difference between poetic produc-
tion (art with words) and visual production (art with physical objects). Taking 
into account the structures of both mediums, Lessing embarks on an analysis 
of the representational and communicational capacities of poetry and painting. 
His considerations are expressed in the discussion of the relation between the 
portrayals of the mythical figure of Laokoon in Virgil’s Aeneid and the sculp-
ture of Laocoon by an unknown artist. According to Lessing, both poetry and 
painting are independent, and moreover, both of them can depict certain quali-
ties that the other cannot.42 Out of that discussion comes one of Lessing’s cen-
tral ideas: poetry has a superior relation to paining as its application is more 
extensive and it can represent realms that painting cannot.43 According to Les-
sing, painting can only represent a moment, but poetry has the ability to repre-
sent certain continuity and in consequence can encompass a larger scope of 
what is being represented.44 The role of art is to give a representation of beau-
ty; art does not aim at particular imitative representations of beautiful ob-
jects.45 Poetry has the ability to represent a larger spectrum of qualities of that 
which it makes present, but, what is even more important, poetry appeals to 
the receiver with greater strength (as poetry is armed with all those qualities 
painting lacks) and makes the viewer’s experience more complex.  
What is important here is Lessing’s understanding of ekphrasis as a device 
or even a literary genre that aims at representing in mediums of art the Idea, 
and his elevation of beauty as the category that has a decisive role in judging 
given representations. Art aims at representing the beautiful, but its role does 
not end there. “[I]n [Lessing’s] view readers and audiences are involved in the 
production process. . . . He regards the recipients of artworks as necessary for 
the work to be completed in the sense of an inner re-creation of the poetic 
world.”46 The audience receives art in space and time but not at the same time 
– these dimensions characterize painting and poetry respectively. “The world 
produced in literature is essentially temporal: the author’s time merges by way 
of the work with the reader’s time; the space of the painter and the sculptor is 
the space of the observer.”47 Although temporality characterizes the realm of 
words and sounds – it takes time to think, to write and to read what is written 
– a particular understanding of time characterizes the way the art of paining is 
appropriated: that is, in the moment.  
How does Lessing’s understanding of mimesis and ekphrasis work in rela-
tion to Kierkegaard? It seems that Kierkegaard, although immensely inspired 
                                                 
41. Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or 1, H. and E. Hong, ed., trans. (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton Univ. Press, 1987), p. 169. 
42. Gotthold E. Lessing, Laocoon. Or the Limits of Poetry and Painting, Ellen Froth-
ingham, trans. (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1887), pp. 91-92. 
43. Gunter Gebauer, Christoph Wulf, Mimesis. Culture. Art. Society (Berkeley: Univ. of 
California Press, 1992), pp. 186-95. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Burwick, Mimesis and its Romantic Reflections, pp. 112-13. 
46. Gebauer, Wulf, Mimesis, pp. 188-89. 
47. Ibid., p. 192. 
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by Lessing’s rendering of aesthetics, gives an alternative understanding of 
mimesis and ekphrasis, especially in his multifaceted understanding of image 
and its role in his philosophy.48 Kierkegaard addresses Lessing in two ways. 
First, in his pseudonymous Either/Or Kierkegaard directly demonstrates the 
limits of both visual and verbal arts through his inability to represent the truly 
Christian quality of humility. Humility’s representation requires the presenta-
tion of the “continuous coming into existence.”49 Following that, the author 
notices that “art…portrayed Christ as the image of patience”50 but he claims 
that this portrayal misses the point as Christ should be portrayed not in pa-
tience, but in suffering. Alas, “long-suffering cannot be portrayed artistically, 
for the point of it is incommensurable with art; neither can it be poetized, for it 
requires the protraction of time.”51 Kierkegaard’s image embodied in the im-
age of the crucified Christ is opposed to Lessing’s rendering of aesthetics. 
What Kierkegaard presents almost represents anti-aesthetics in relation to Les-
sing’s rendering. The image of the crucified Christ is ugly – conversely to 
Lessing’s understanding that the role of aesthetics is to represent what is beau-
tiful – and it represents violence and chaos – conversely to Lessing’s idea that 
art should represent harmony.  
Second, Kierkegaard’s different approach to mimesis and ekphrasis can be 
seen in a cooperative and synergic understanding of various mediums of art, 
contrary to Lessing bringing to the fore one particular type of art over another. 
The image of the dead Christ – conversely to Lessing’s rendering of the limit 
and capacity of art to represent the idea and to his differentiation of one art 
over another – is not reserved to one particular medium, but is structurally 
consist across various mediums. Consequently, the image of the dead Christ is 
Kierkegaard’s alternative to Lessing’s critique of ekphrasis, because it is un-
derstood as the synergy and cooperation of various mediums of art within the 
work; the image of the crucified Christ is in fact, on the one hand, a spoken 
picture, and on the other hand, a visualized narrative. Kierkegaard’s rendering 
of ekphrasis concentrates on the effects the image has on the receiver. Alt-
hough the image of the dead Christ is a picture, it does not have just one mo-
ment of appropriation – contrary to how Lessing sees the role of a picture – 
                                                 
48. Although the extent of Kierkegaard’s inspiration taken from Lessing is a subject of 
ongoing discussion, it is certain that the Dane knew the writings of Lessing well enough to 
both directly and indirectly refer to the thinker in his considerations. Such methodology of 
indirect references to a thinker without acknowledging the thinker by Kierkegaard is an in-
herent part of his literary style. In my brief comparison of the philosophers I take this 
methodology into account, emphasizing structural and thematic relations between the con-
tent of their writings, which illuminate links between their renderings of aesthetics. 
49. Kierkegaard, Either/Or 1, p. 135. “Humility is hard to portray precisely because it is 
sequence, and whereas the observer needs to see pride only at its climax, in the second case 
he really needs to see something that poetry and art cannot provide, to see its continuous 
coming into existence, for it is essential to humility to come into existence continuously, 
and if this is shown to him in its ideal moment, he misses something, for he senses that its 
true ideality consists not in its being ideal at the moment but in its being continuous.” 
50. Ibid., p. 136 
51. Ibid. 
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but it is being constantly re-appropriated and re-understood by the receiver 
throughout his life. This kind of image, in its synergy with a spoken narrative, 
has its effect spread over time. We will see a similar methodology in Dostoev-
sky’s understanding of the confines of the image.  
In his critique of Lessing’s theory of aesthetics, Kierkegaard does not 
merely disregard Lessing’s idea. On the contrary,52 Kierkegaard incorporates 
into his image of the crucified Christ Lessing’s theory of the recipient’s role in 
the process of production of the image.53 According to Lessing, the receiver of 
an aesthetic production has to recreate in his own world the message conveyed 
in the artwork.54  
This notion of Lessing’s theory is strongly present in the thought of Kier-
kegaard and one could identify its twofold manifestation. On one level we see 
this idea occurring in Kierkegaard’s concept of the martyr portrayed over the 
course of his late writings, according to which a reader becomes a martyr 
(Kierkegaard himself as a reader of his own writings is of no exception here – 
he appropriates the idea into his own life and becomes a sort of a martyr him-
self55). On another level, however, we read that “the picture of the Crucified 
One” creates another picture by the virtue of reproduction through resembling 
– by staring at the picture of the Crucified Christ, the child is “becoming…the 
picture that resembled him.”56 That is, the picture creates another picture, and 
the child, in the process of comprehending the picture of the crucified Christ, 
ultimately embarks on representing in its own self the sufferings of Christ. 
The child grows to be a man who seeks the answer to the eponymous question 
of the essay – the essay that outlines the narrative space of its existence – 
Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself be Put to Death for the 
Truth? 
Contrary to Kierkegaard, who does not refer to any particular physical rep-
resentation of the image of the dead Christ in his discourse (although one fa-
miliar with the pietistic background of Kierkegaard would be aware of the 
kind of art Kierkegaard has in mind57), Dostoevsky introduces a piece of art 
that can be easily identified. Prince Muishkin in fact recognizes the painting in 
                                                 
52. As indicated in footnote 48, Kierkegaard draws upon Lessing extensively. An ex-
ample from another pseudonymous work of Kierkegaard The Concept of Anxiety shows 
that the Dane incorporates into his concept of aesthetics Lessing’s belief that the medium of 
the word allows the communicated message to be conveyed in time. On the other hand 
Kierkegaard disagrees with Lessing, insisting that the moment – the sudden – is important 
to break from the timelessness of art. Religiously speaking the moment is the instance of 
kairotic time; aesthetically speaking the moment is a pure abstraction. See: Søren Kierke-
gaard, The Concept of Anxiety, H. and E. Hong, ed., trans. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1980), p. 132. “The words and the speaking, no matter how short when regarded in 
abstracto, always have a certain continuity for the reason that they are heard in time. But 
the sudden is a complete abstraction from continuity, from the past and from the future.” 
53. Gebauer, Wulf, Mimesis, p. 188 
54. Ibid. 
55. Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard. A Biography, Bruce H. Kirmmse, trans. (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 626-36, 732-92; See also footnote 65. 
56. Kierkegaard, Without Authority, p. 55. 
57. See: Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness, pp. 47-57. 
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the book. The Russian novelist engages with ekphrasis in The Idiot in a simi-
lar manner to Kierkegaard, by addressing its synergic function that interrelates 
the visual of the image of the dead Christ with its spoken re-representation in 
the text. In fact “of the twenty-six or so biblical allusions in the novel, the ma-
jority concern the Crucifixion, followed by Apocalypse.”58 Dostoevsky ren-
ders the image of the dead Christ across the novel and situates it in key mo-
ments of the plot, thus spreading the image of the dead Christ over both time 
and space. By engaging Muishkin, Rogojin, and Hippolyte with the image of 
the dead Christ, Dostoevsky allows the reader to approach the image in sever-
al modes. Although the three figures consider the image of the dead Christ dif-
ferently, they are univocal in indicating the silence of the broken human body. 
All the apocalyptic visions painted by Lebedeff are nonsensical and pointless 
if we permit Holbein’s painting to speak for itself. Christ is dead…God is 
dead: this is the “anti-Gospel” of the modern times in all its brutality and 
plainness. Appealing to ekphrasis, “Dostoevsky strives to transcend the limits 
of his genre, which requires telling rather than showing. The result is a pro-
found tension between…word and image. The two work together; the image 
can bear meaning only in profoundly human silence, molchanie, that great re-
lease that comes when the struggle with words finally subsides.”59 The silence 
is present not only in Christ’s inability to speak for himself, but also in the tac-
iturnity that follows Hippolyte’s speech, that is Muishkin’s inability to say an-
ything to save the Christian faith. It is also present in the absence of Resurrec-
tion in the biblical narrative that is woven into the text and the tragic events 
that end the novel.60  
Although it is most likely that Dostoevsky never read Lessing’s works, we 
can still find in his presentation of the image of the dead Christ an invitation 
directed towards the reader to face the death of God and to “experience” the 
drama of the image of the dead Christ. The above-mentioned silence that fol-
lows the image of the dead Christ “guarantees” the reader’s freedom through 
her recreation of the image in her own personal world. What is also true of 
other works of the Russian novelist, and what we are reminded of especially 
when reading him alongside Kierkegaard’s concept of indirect communica-
tion, is that the “readers of Dostoevsky…are not merely spectators at a trage-
dy, no matter how powerful the emotional catharsis such an experience may 
offer.”61 
 
III. Reintroducing the Christian ideal 
                                                 
58. Diane Oenning Thompson, “Problems of the Biblical Word in Dostoevsky’s Poet-
ics,” Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition, ed. George Pattison, Dianne Oenning 
Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001), p. 73 
59. Carol Apollonio Flath, Dostoevsky's Secrets: Reading against the Grain (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 2009), pp. 166-67.  
60. For a different appraisal presenting that the lack of an explicitly-mentioned resurrec-
tion indicates its inherent hidden presence, see: Flath, Dostoevsky's Secrets: Reading 
Against the Grain, pp. 96-98. 
61. George Pattison, “Reading Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky Together,” Dostoevsky and 
the Christian Tradition, p. 251. 
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So far I have argued that Kierkegaard’s and Dostoevsky’s engagements 
with the image of the dead Christ are deliberately implemented first to rede-
fine Christianity and second to challenge some dominant renderings of aes-
thetics. In this final part of my essay, following what has already been stated, I 
show that the thinkers render the image of the dead Christ as a means of re-
contextualizing and reintroducing Christianity. To challenge the way modern 
people understand Christianity, Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky initiate new 
models of the Christian ideal that confront the standards established in their 
societies. As we will shortly see, the thinkers usually portray these models as 
figures marked by a certain type of “degradation and suffering” –features that 
are “to be seen as a mode of the incognito of Christ.”62  
Kierkegaard’s categories of the aesthete and the ethical represent the way 
the thinker structures his anthropology on the one hand, and how he sees his 
society on the other. Hegelianism and, opposing the movement, the thought of 
the Romantics represented by thinkers like Friedrich von Schlegel, Ludwig 
Tieck and Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger – permeated intellectual discourses 
of Kierkegaard’s contemporaries.63 The Romantics believed that the creative 
‘I’ of the extraordinary has no limits and that a genius is more than merely 
someone with talent. In art they sought the real medium and a representation 
of the highest there is in a human being. In their thinking, the Romantics criti-
cized a society that threatened the particularity of an individual; they believed 
that the social order is in fact an artificial construction that suppresses the 
uniqueness of a particular person. The Romantics believed that they are not 
inescapably rooted in the rigidness of any religious-social-political institution 
and that they can create themselves without referring to those contingent con-
structs. Their critique, which was an all-out war on the established order, 
found opponents in the philosophy of Hegel and Hegelians.  
The followers of Hegel perceived the established order to be a natural con-
sequence of the logically-developing Idea. Hegelianism reinforced structures 
of religion, society and politics, showing that each of these are part of a larger 
picture, that is an historically-driven process. According to Kierkegaard, the 
philosophy of Hegel, by situating a single individual only as a meaningless 
part of a larger entity, devaluated the meaning of that individual. Neither 
group in their bilateral criticism grasped the merit of Christianity according to 
Kierkegaard, and in consequence reduced it to something either completely ir-
relevant and oppressive or temporary and provisional.   
The Romantics engrossed in sensuality and egoism on the one hand, and 
disoriented in the spiritual cul-de-sac of melancholy and nihilism on the other, 
represent Kierkegaard’s aesthete. Their opponents, immersed in self-
complacency, career, and the business of the bourgeois life, resonate with 
                                                 
62. George Pattison, Anxious Angels. A retrospective View of Religious Existentialism 
(Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 61. “For Dostoevsky as for Kierkegaard degra-
dation and suffering come to be seen as a mode of the incognito of Christ, although for 
more graphically portrayed than in Kierkegaard.” 
63. Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press. 2007), pp. 170-81, 622-52. 
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Kierkegaard’s concept of the ethical.64 However, for Kierkegaard it is neither 
the sensual nor the commonsensical that represent what it is to be a Christian. 
The genuine Christian is the one who risks his life for truth (in contrast with 
both the aesthete who contests any concept of truth, or the ethical who is not 
willing to risk anything) and the one who will lose it for this cause: the mar-
tyr.65  
The child from Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous work reduplicates in his own 
life the answer to the eponymous question of the essay Does a Human Being 
Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?, and thus he be-
comes a martyr. The child goes through a process of mental preparation to be-
come a martyr, an undertaking which resonates with another title of an al-
ready-mentioned pseudonymous work of Kierkegaard, Practice to Christiani-
ty. An alternative translation of this title is also illuminating because it chang-
es the word “practice” for ‘training.”66 Both translations profoundly represent 
the meditational aspect of these works, as they are rooted in the devotional lit-
erature of dovotio moderna, but they also exceed its contemplative dimension, 
illuminating the very practical and physical aspect of the undertaking. In fact, 
the author of Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to 
Death for the Truth? is dead. The essay is a posthumous work. His attack on 
established Christianity comprises his written work and his death, which cor-
responds with this work. The martyr is a guerrilla or a terrorist because he un-
dertakes his attack “from behind” and “without authority”. He fires his “guns” 
and “awaits” a spiritual awakening. The martyr-guerrilla is therefore a model 
of the true Christian and consequently, as shown above, it represents the pic-
ture of the dead Christ by ultimately “becoming…the picture that resembled 
him” in the extreme.67 
Dostoevsky’s model of the Christian ideal is different from the one pre-
sented by Kierkegaard, but no less controversial. It is the inherent quality of 
                                                 
64. Still however, Kierkegaard calls the bourgeois life “the aesthetic” to accentuate the 
life that “fails to live up to its ethical potential.” See Pattison, “Kierkegaard: Aesthetics and 
‘the Aesthetic,’ ” pp. 140, 148. 
65. Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 1: 481. “Being a Christian 
is neither more nor less, without a doubt neither more nor less, than being a martyr; every 
Christian, that is, every true Christian, is a martyr;” 3: 2649. “Then the tyrant dies, and his 
rule is over; the martyr dies, and his rule begins. The tyrant was the egotistic individual 
who inhumanly ruled over the masses, made the others into a mass and ruled over the mass. 
The martyr is the suffering single individual who in his love of mankind educates others in 
Christianity, converting the mass into single individuals. . . .Whole volumes could be writ-
ten about this alone, even by me, a kind of poet and philosopher, to say nothing of the one 
who is coming, the philosopher-poet or the poet-philosopher, who, in addition, will have 
seen close at hand the object of my presentiments at a distance, will have seen accom-
plished what I only dimly imagine will be carried out sometime in a distant future.”  See 
Wojciech Kaftánski, “Mimesis in Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be 
Put to Death for the Truth? Remarks on the Formation of the Self, Kierkegaard Studies 
Yearbook (2011), pp. 195-219. 
66. Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity: And the Edifying Discourse Which 
“Accompanied” It, Walter Lowrie, trans. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941). 
67. Kierkegaard, Without Authority, p. 55. 
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paradox that fundamentally marks the Christian models in the writings of both 
thinkers. Dostoevsky in The Idiot depicts the Christian ideal in the figure of 
Prince Muishkin68 and this protagonist, in his various encounters with the 
characters of the book, reveals the condition of Russian society. Muishkin suf-
fers from idiocy mixed with epilepsy.69 His long-term treatment in Switzer-
land does not bring significant positive results and he comes back to his home-
land as a poor invalid without prospects. Simply through his naivety and sim-
plicity Muishkin becomes entangled in a series of complex events in St. Pe-
tersburg. His short existence in the modern city makes him acquainted with 
persons from various states of society. Muishkin finds himself involved in a 
sagacious and deceitful game between former aristocrats, emerging bourgeoi-
sie, nihilist intellectuals and “commonplace people.”70 He is being taken ad-
vantage of by all of them, but the consequences of their actions often turn 
against their intentions. It is through him and in him that others can under-
stand their true motives, and can measure the authenticity of their Christianity. 
Right at the beginning of the book the reader is informed that the protagonist 
does not respond with a sense of natural suspicion to impertinence and inap-
propriateness.71 Interrogated in a train carriage he unreservedly talks about his 
                                                 
68. The matter of whether Muishkin is a Christian model is debatable. In favour of this 
opinion is the inter alia appraisal presented by Liza Knapp, “Myshkin through a Murky 
Glass, Guessingly,” Dostoevsky's The Idiot: A Critical Companion, Liza Knapp, ed. (Ev-
anston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1998), pp. 191-217. Some scholars either disagree 
with perceiving Muishkin as a Christian model or claim that Muishkin is a failed model, 
see Thompson, “Problems of the Biblical Word in Dostoevsky’s Poetics,” pp. 75-76, or see 
Muishkin as a tragic figure: Sarah J. Young, Dostoevsky's The Idiot and the Ethical Foun-
dations of Narrative: Reading, Narrating, Scripting (London: Anthem Press, 2004), pp. 75-
135. For a general overview of the problem, see Sarah J. Young “Introduction” to Dostoev-
sky's The Idiot and the Ethical Foundations of Narrative, especially, pp. 1-10 and Harriet 
Murav, Holy Foolishness: Dostoevsky's Novels & the Poetics of Cultural Critique (Stan-
ford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 74-75. 
69. Although I am positioning Muishkin as a Christian ideal in this essay, I believe also, 
as I have suggested already in the first part of this analysis, that Hippolyte serves as a 
Christian model for Dostoevsky in The Idiot. It seems that both characters represent two 
sides of the Christian ideal. They share certain physical illnesses (idiocy/epilepsy and tu-
berculosis), both receive a certain revelation in their attacks of fits (Muishkin) and delirium 
(Hippolyte). In his My Necessary Explanation, Hippolyte reformulates Muishkin’s con-
cerns about the devastating influence of the image of the dead Christ. Muishkin represent 
the selfless goodness of Christian ideal and Hippolyte accounts for the existential experi-
ence while facing the absolute of the unknown. Julia Kristeva, although she situates Hip-
polyte as a minor character in The Idiot, she agrees that he is “the narrator’s and Myshkin’s 
double.” See Julia Kristeva, The Black Sun, Leon S. Roudiez, trans. (New York: Columbia 
Univ. Press, 1992), p. 107. 
70. Dostoevsky’s term. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 443. “There are certain people of 
whom it is difficult to say anything which will at once throw them into relief – in other 
words, describe them graphically in their typical characteristics. These are they who are 
generally known as ‘commonplace people,’ and this class comprises, of course, the im-
mense majority of mankind. Authors, as a rule, attempt to select and portray types rarely 
met with in their entirety, but these types are nevertheless more real than real life itself.” 
71. Dostoevsky, The Idiot, p. 2. “He seemed to have no suspicion of any impertinence 
or inappropriateness in the fact of such questions being put to him.” 
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lack of mental health, lack of money, lack of any abode in the place he was 
going to, and lack of any concrete plans for the near future. Both of his fellow 
travelers Rogojin and Lebedeff make fun of the protagonist. But this is merely 
the beginning of a stream of ridicule and mockery that will be part of Muish-
kin’s experience in St. Petersburg. He continues to be an object of amusement 
for the Epanchins family to whom he is distantly related. His naivety, selfless 
devotion and “otherworld approach to life”72 make the majority of characters 
of the novel feel drawn to him, but on the other hand Muishkin’s qualities re-
pel them. Muishkin’s condition also discloses his interlocutors as conflicted 
individuals. People address him in a conflicted manner: Nastasia Philipovna 
and Aglaya Epanchin both love the man in various ways, but when they find 
out that his pure love would make them prone to taking advantage of him, 
they ultimately refuse him.  
The Christian ideal embedded in the figure of Muishkin serves as a fulcrum 
for the author’s analysis of the condition of the Russian society of the city.73 
The depicted people of St. Petersburg – the city that has dramatically and fun-
damentally changed since Muishkin’s last stay – are bored, capricious, whim-
sical, opportunistic, and calculative. Muishkin in contrast is deficient of 
shrewdness, craftiness, the ability to plot strategies, and “reflection.” He is dif-
ferent and his difference is marked, as he clearly emphasizes, by his mental 
and physical condition. In the age of modernity it is the idiot that retains the 
“true humane” and represents a true Christian. 
This conception can be grasped through the situation of Nastasia Philipov-
na whose “case” is among the main affairs of the book. It is in her that the de-
sires of almost all the characters of the book culminate. Nastasia is being ob-
jectified by participants of a socially-established rivalry, and her true good is 
scarcely the concern of the ongoing affairs. Muishkin is the only one who 
shows her compassion. He cannot marry Nastasia because he is an invalid—
he is not driven by various overpowering passions like those who try to take 
financial, sexual or social advantage of her. All he has for her and for others is 
simply “unreflected” and unmediated love. Muishkin perceives Nastasia as a 
victim and as a lost soul engrossed in despair. His perspective seems to be in 
agreement with that of the narrator who strengthens Muishkin’s intuition by 
presenting her former keeper Totsky in a pejorative light. Dostoevsky’s de-
scription of Totsky, who greatly contributes to Nastasia’s misery and mental 
imbalance, both reinforces Muishkin’s perception of Nastasia and betrays the 
author’s criticism of the self-complacent bourgeoisie: “his position was solid 
and respectable; his place in society had long been firmly fixed upon safe 
foundations; he loved himself, his personal comforts, and his position better 
than all the world, as every respectable gentleman should!”74 Totsky’s diagno-
sis of Nastasia is that she is insatiable, but it seems that it is he who suffers 
from financial and social insatiability. Another description of the city people 
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73. George Pattison, Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth Crisis of Culture (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 204-10. 
74. Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, p. 40.  
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can be found in Dostoevsky’s description of the Epanchins immersed in cele-
brating typical bourgeoisie rituals like elaborate dinners, teas, coffees, read-
ings, instrument playing, etc.  Muishkin in contrast does not follow the social 
standards and often misses the courtesy protocol, unveiling its artificiality and 
pitifulness.  
Muishkin’s holy idiocy is compared with Lebedeff’s buffoonery. The for-
mer claims he has “lived less than other people”75 and therefore he knows less 
of life. The latter knows more than a regular inhabitant of a city. Although he 
is able to formulate prophetic visions of the inhuman and apocalyptic tech-
nologization of the emerging modern era, his wise thoughts mix with his op-
portunistic knowledge about the whereabouts of those he simultaneously ad-
mires and despises. His criticism of industrialization and the development of 
railroads does not stop him from desiring the wealth of those who made mon-
ey in that business. Muishkin’s lack of knowledge protects him from the effect 
of the emerging civilization of technology; he does not know much, but he re-
tains the inner goodness and authenticity.76 
Lastly, Muishkin’s religious exceptionality expresses itself in the fact that 
he receives religious insights through and in his illness. His spasmatic fits are 
the foundation of his religious experience. He is contrasted with Rogojin who 
although coming from pious Old Believers kills Nastasia out of passion. In 
fact Muishkin himself at the beginning of the book is prophesying the murder, 
when he answers Gania’s question as to whether Rogojin could merry Nasta-
sia: “Why not? Certainly he would, I should think. He would marry her tomor-
row!—marry her tomorrow and murder her in a week!’77  
 
IV. Conclusion 
It comes as no surprise to find that reading Kierkegaard alongside Dostoev-
sky is beneficial. This essay has drawn upon the intuition that these two think-
ers share a similar understanding of the time and space they inhabit. Kierke-
gaard and Dostoevsky are great observers and their examinations and analysis 
of the modern man are still valid even in our times. In this article I have tried 
to show how the thinkers understood and articulated the crisis of nineteenth-
century culture and religion. I have also attempted to present the way in which 
the thinkers perceived the social changes in their societies as marked by the 
emergence of the new individual but also of the new class of bourgeoisie.  
I have drawn upon the way in which Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky related 
to the discussion on aesthetics, showing that the image of the dead Christ chal-
lenges the naïve and shallow ideas of beauty as the highest expression of 
form. I have also shown that the thinkers perceived aesthetics as limited in 
their representation of the true life full of passion, love, and suffering and de-
cay. The image of the dead Christ however is still a means of aesthetics, but it 
is redefined by the thinkers in a way that goes beyond its purely artistic con-
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fines. It is a dynamic and forceful image that communicates and interacts with 
the viewer-reader.  
In this essay I intended to show that the engagements of Kierkegaard and 
Dostoevsky with the image of the dead Christ aim at redefining the common 
view of Christianity. By undertaking this task, the thinkers introduce challeng-
ing models of the Christian ideal. Kierkegaard’s guerilla-martyr and Dostoev-
sky’s Christian-idiot impel their “interlocutors” to their own deconstruction. 
Subsequently, these models of the ideal Christian open the sphere of possibil-
ity for an individual to embark on “growing to be” a genuine Christian, a pro-
cess that consists in perpetually becoming a Christian in following Christ (for 
Kierkegaard) and in approaching one’s notion of Christianity through the in-
escapable uncertainty of death (for Dostoevsky). 
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